Defeatist Doctrines The unsentimental historian will probably rind the most fascinating aspect of Western Europe's Middle East policy those nations' failure to understand - or their refusal to examine the rather obvious fact that throwing Israel to the wolves inevitably must prove disastrous to them. Paying blackmail demands with Israel's security may provide a temporary warming up of relations with the Arab states; but it will involve a long step towards the loss of their own independence. Politics is often a matter of making the right choice. To this end it is desirable to understand what the alternatives are. Neville Chamberlain (who remains a decidedly relevant figure for our time) believed he was choosing between a "minor" sacrifice, by the Czechs, of their border province of Sudetenland, and plunging the world into war. There is no certainty at all that Hitler would have gone to war. What is certain is that Chamberlain was blind to Hitler's plain purpose. In spite of all Hitler had threatened and done Chamberlain simply did' not realize that Sudetenland was Hitler's essential gateway to Prague on the road to the subjugation of Europe, including Britain. By the summer of 1940, Britain was fighting for her life alone. The road from Munich led inexorably to the Battle of Britain. The Soviets are not planning world domination by way of war. They aim at an intimidating superiority. Aided by the incredibly myopic policy of detente which in Russian semantics means Western aid in strengthening the Russian economy and deepening and expanding her technological capacity the USSR is on the way to achieving her purpose. One small example illustrates the relative perceptions of the parties. The Americans assumed that the Soviets agreed with their assumption that nuclear parity assured mutual deterrence because nuclear war would then bring about mutual assured destruction (jocularly called MAD). The Americans, therefore, obediently refrained from building a comprehensive civil defence system. Precisely like Chamberlain, they made a slight error: the Soviets had other ideas. They developed the doctrine that, instead of resigning themselves to the prospect of unchangeable stalemate, they should aim at winning a nuclear war. They therefore did build a comprehensive civil defence system. In consequence, the number of American casualties (by US estimates) of a Soviet nuclear strike would be eight times that of Soviet casualties from an American strike (an "acceptable" 20 million). At the same time, the USSR has developed a world wide strategy of expansionism. She has become a major sea power, ranging far beyond the dreams of 200 year old Russian imperialism. Asia and Africa seethe with her incessant activity. Here again she has been aided by the myopia and the obtuse illusions of the pleasure loving West. (Dr. Kissinger used to plead eloquently against charges of Russian expansionism). She has employed local insurrection in far flung operations, with a high proportion of success. The use of Cubans as proxies for Soviet soldiers and advisers was a brilliant stroke. By such means, and by alert exploitation of opportunities the USSR, in the years between SALT I and SALT 11, has established a preponderant influence in eight countries in Asia and Africa. The central purpose of her strategy in Africa and the Middle East is the outflanking of the countries of Western Europe, and has much to do with the control of raw materials and their delivery. Where Hitler was forced, in most cases, to win country after country by invading them, the Soviet Union (already the overlord of Eastern Europe) aims at the psychological collapse of Western Europe. In 1938 Sudetenland, a mere province in east central Europe, was the essential key to Hitler's strategy of domination. Today in the Soviets' global strategy, an indispensable stage is the shrinking of Israel, a miniscule triangle on the map. The USSR has devoted much time and energy and resource to this objective. In 1967 she actively provoked war, for the one swoop elimination of Israel. She trained and armed the Egyptians for the 1973 war; and on its outbreak publicly urged the Arab states to join the Egyptians and the Syrians. Her dividends were enormous. Through the opening of the Suez Canal she achieved complete freedom of movement for her ships, and predominance in the Indian Ocean; and the removal of all obstacles to her activity in Africa. The Soviets today view with satisfaction the dismantling of Israeli power in Sinai. The drastic reduction in Israel's strategic reach southward and south eastward by the elimination of her airfields and the closing of the Israeli naval base at Sharm ei Sheikh, no matter what takes their place, will dissolve the only serious stable source of deterrence or interference from the north with potential Soviet action in and from the Horn of Africa. Now, from the Soviet point of view, comes the final phase in this theatre: the shrinking of Israel in Western Palestine. Even after the grim reduction in her strategic capacity by the loss of Sinai, Israel would remain the only serious deterrent in the area. In the security conditions prevalent in the region, Israel protects both Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is not difficult to see the impact of Israel's reduction to strategic impotence on the security of Western interests in the Middle East. The loss to the West of Israel's capacity would, however, be accompanied by a priceless addition to Soviet power. Israel would be replaced in Judea and Samaria by the Arabs. Inevitably control would be in the hands of the Arabs' recognized leadership the "PLO," a client of the Soviet Union. And at that point Soviet strategy would be activated. The PLO would not last in power a month without Soviet support, and intervention, whether by Cubans or otherwise. The Soviet goal is to establish a second Yemen or Angola in Western Palestine. The inevitable consequence of Western European efforts to achieve the shrinking of Israel will thus be the establishment of a Soviet client state in Palestine, on the borders of Saudi Arabia. How long will it then be before the USSR, without having to send a single Soviet soldier, can dictate her terms for non intervention to Saudi Arabia? How long will it be before the Arab blackmail of Europe is merged with Soviet blackmail? How long before the countries of Western Europe, dependent on Middle Eastern oil, are reduced to the status of Finland? There is certainly still time to prevent this course of events. There is still enough strength in the West. But essential for its effective application is a thorough rethinking of the prevailing defeatist doctrine and a thorough shake up of the dominant mouse like policy. 14.9.79