16 July 2005

Louis Rene Beres

Professor of International Law

Department of Political Science

Purdue University

Beering Hall

West Lafayette IN  47907


TEL     765      494-4189

FAX    765      494-0833



            Israel now faces grave dangers from Iran, a hostile Islamic state deeply involved in production of nuclear and certain other weapons of mass destruction.[i]  In essence, the Jewish State will soon have only two options vis-a-vis Iran: (1) sit tight, do nothing militarily, and hope that deterrence, political agreements and/or economic sanctions will prevent Iranian mega-aggression;[ii]  or (2) strike preemptively against pertinent military targets, thereby expressing what international law calls "anticipatory self-defense."[iii]   Should it choose the former, Israel would avoid offending the "international community," Yet, this choice would carry a substantial risk of inviting unconventional war and unconventional terrorism.  Should it choose the second option, Israel would give offense to the international community and very likely undermine its special relationship with Washington, but it would also likely reduce the risk of overwhelming destruction from Iran.  The second option would generate unpopularity for Israel, and would probably be less than entirely effective, but it would assuredly be more gainful than being popularly dead.

            Does Israel have the right to strike first under international law? In the best of all possible worlds, reasonable concerns about an overbroad right of anticipatory self-defense would be well taken.  Here, for example, a specially-constituted world body  - a UN-type institution displaying both real authority and real capability - could ensure that powerful aggressor states do not act at will.  But we do not yet live in such a world.  Instead, states continue to coexist within the decentralized dynamics of Westphalian[iv]  law that have obtained since the middle of the seventeenth century.  In this world, one still very much like the world satirized by Voltaire's Candide, states that would renounce altogether the right of anticipatory self-defense could be blatantly suicidal.  For a state such as Israel,  a state less than half the size of San Bernardino County in California and smaller than Lake Michigan, a state that is surrounded by twenty-two hostile Arab states,[v](soon to be twenty-three, after the creation of "Palestine")  such renunciation could be tantamount to  an acceptance of its own genocide.[vi]

            It is true that the right of anticipatory self-defense can be abused and that maintaining this right under international law always carries certain serious risks.  Yet, an across the board renunciation of anticipatory self-defense would carry even greater risks.  Indeed, where it is supported by distinguished scholars, the informed argument for anticipatory self-defense has assuredly grown stronger in the nuclear age.[vii]  Waiting patiently to absorb an enemy attack before striking could now represent the reductio ad absurdum of "legalism" in international law. This is the fallacy or error in reasoning that treats law as an automatically effective set of rules.

            The right of self-defense by forestalling an attack appears in Hugo Grotius' THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE.[viii] (1625). Recognizing the need for protection against "present danger" and threatening behavior that is imminent in point of time,[ix]  Grotius indicates that self-defense is permitted not only after an attack has already been suffered, but also in advance, where "the deed may be anticipated."[x]  Or, as he says a bit further on in the same chapter,  "It be lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill...."[xi]

            Emmerich de Vattel takes a similar position in his THE LAW OF NATIONS (1758). Here, he argues that it is lawful to resist and even to anticipate attacks by other nations so long as aggression is truly forthcoming.  "The safest plan," says Vattel, "is to prevent evil, where that is possible.  A Nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and every other just means of resistance against the aggressor."[xii]

            Today, some scholars argue that the specific language of Article 51 of the UN Charter overrides the customary right of anticipatory self-defense.  In this view, which effectively undermines the authoritative non-treaty sources of international law identified at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,[xiii]   Article 51 fashions a new and far more restrictive statement of self-defense.  This narrow interpretation ignores that international law must refuse to compel a state to wait until it absorbs a devastating or even lethal first strike before acting to protect itself.[xiv]  Regarding Israel's preemptive attack in June 1967, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly censured this attack, thereby signifying implicit approval by the United Nations of this particular resort to anticipatory self-defense.[xv]

            During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, in a flagrantly lawless action, Iraq launched thirty-nine Scud missile attacks directly against Israeli civilian populations.  On October 7, 1991, more than seven months after the conclusion of hostilities, UN inspectors discovered a complex of buildings that had served as Saddam Hussein's covert nuclear weapons program.  It was here, at an installation called Al Atheer, about 40 miles south of Baghdad, that Iraq planned to "design and produce a nuclear device."[xvi]   And these preparations were underway after Israel's strike at the Osiraq reactor ten years earlier.  What would have been Israel's fate, after absorbing 39 Iraqi missile attacks during the Gulf War, if Prime Minister Begin had not previously asserted the right of anticipatory self-defense under international law in Israel's 1981 destruction of Baghdad's Osiraq reactor?[xvii]   One needn't have a good imagination to answer this particular question!  Would Israel's critics have preferred Israel to absorb multiple nuclear attacks as the price of conforming to his restrictive view of permissible self-defense?  Would this have been a reasonable preference under international law?  I think not.

            For the Arab world, Israel was the aggressor in 1948 and, again, in 1967.  Significantly, when Israel avoided preemptive measures in 1973, an avoidance Israel's critics would doubtless describe as lawful, the resultant Arab surprise attack on Yom Kippur almost ended in a total Israeli defeat. 

            Regarding the War of 1948, the United Nations placed responsibility for aggression on the Arab states.  The UN Palestine Commission was never permitted by the Arabs or the British to go to Palestine to implement the resolution of the General Assembly.  On February 16, 1948, the Commission reported to the Security Council:  "Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein."[xviii]

            The Arabs themselves  were altogether open in accepting responsibility for starting their first war on Israel.  Jamal Husseini told the Security Council on April 16, 1948: "The representatives of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday they they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting.  We did not deny this.  We told the whole world that we were going to fight."[xix]   As for the British commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb, he commented as follows:  "Early in January, the first detachments of the Arab Liberation Army began to infiltrate into Palestine from Syria.  Some came through Jordan and even through Amman....They were in reality to strike the first blow in the ruin of the Arabs of Palestine."[xx]

            Israel came into being on May 14, 1948.  The five Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq immediately invaded the new ministate.  Their combined intention was expressed publicly by Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League:  "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades."[xxi]   This is the war Arab states still seek to defend under international law.

            Let us consider the 1967 (Six-Day) War.  On May 15, Israel's Independence Day, Egyptian troops began moving into the Sinai, massing near the Israeli border.  By May 18, Syrian troops, too, were preapring for battle along the Golan Heights, where - from 3000 feet above the Galilee, they had shelled Israel's farms and villages with impunity for years.  Egypt's Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force, stationed in the Sinai since 1956, to withdraw.  After the withdrawal of the UNEF, the Voice of the Arabs proclaimed, on May 18, 1967:  "As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect Israel.  We shall exercise patience no more.  We shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel.  The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence."[xxii]  Two days later an enthusiastic echo came from Hafez Assad, then Syria's Defense Minister:  "Our forces are now entirely initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland.  ...the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation."[xxiii]

            President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq, a country now more closely identified with the aggressions of recently-deposed Saddam Hussein, joined the chorus of genocidal threats:  "The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified.  This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948.  Our goal is clear - to wipe Israel off the map."[xxiv]   On June 4, Iraq formally joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

            On June 7, 1981, Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor shortly before it was to go "on line." At the time, the general community reaction was overwhelmingly hostile.  Even the UN Security Council, in Resolution 487 of June 19, 1981, indicated that it "strongly condemns" the attack and that "Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered."

            No less than Israel's own citizens, both Jews and Arabs, American and other coalition soldiers who fought in the 1991 Gulf War may owe their lives to Israel's courage, skill and foresight in June 1981.[xxv]   Had it not been for the raid at Osiraq, Saddam Hussein's forces might have been equipped with atomic warheads in 1991.  Ironically, the Saudis, too, are in Jerusalem's debt.  Had it not been for Prime Minister Begin's resolve, Saddam's Scuds falling on Saudi Arabia might have spawned immense casualties and lethal irradiation.

            The jurisprudential correctness of Israel's 1981 expression of anticipatory self-defense against Iraq is manifestly obvious.  International law is not a suicide pact.  Narrowly technical interpretations of permissible force notwithstanding, no state - Israel included - can be required to invite overwhelming aggression.  Recently this point was made with considerable specificity in a report to Prime Minister Sharon by "Project Daniel." This report, ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE, is now available online, and should be studied closely in the months ahead by all interested parties.


LOUIS RENE BERES (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) is Chair of "Project Daniel."


                        [i]..         For earlier writings by this author, see: Louis Rene Beres, "Israel and the Bomb," a dialogue with Zeev Maoz, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Harvard), Vol. 29, No. 1., Summer 2004, pp. 1-4; Louis Rene Beres, "Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor" (with COL/IDF Res. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto), Menachem Begin Heritage Center, ISRAEL'S STRIKE AGAINST THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 7 June 1981, Jerusalem, Israel, September 2003, pp. 59-60; Louis Rene Beres, "The Bomb in the Basement,"  NATIV Online, Vol. 1, 2003, 12 pp; Louis Rene Beres, "Nuclear Deterrence in Israel: A Special Memorandum to the Prime Minister, NATIV: A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Israel (Hebrew), Vol. 15, No. 1., January 2002, pp. 72-80; Louis Rene Beres, "`Strategic Balance' in the Middle East: An Injurious Concept," MIDSTREAM, Vol. XXXXVII, No. 5., pp. 4-6; Louis Rene Beres, "Israeli Nuclear Deterrence,"  MIDSTREAM, February/March 2001, Vol. XXXXVII, No. 2., pp. 10-12; Louis Rene Beres, "Iran's Growing Threat To Israel," MIDSTREAM, Vol. XXXXVI, No. 7., November 2000, pp. 2-4; Louis Rene Beres, "In Support of Anticipatory Self-Defense: Israel, Osiraq and International Law," CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, Vol. 19, No. 2., August 1998, pp. 111-114; Louis Rene Beres, "Israel's Nuclear Strategy: Ambiguity, Disclosure, Doctrine," DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 26, No. 2., Winter 1998, pp. 209-233; Louis Rene Beres, "Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and Dangers to Israel of False Hope," ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Vol. 23, No. 4., Summer 1997, pp. 539-568; Louis Rene Beres, "Getting Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Israel, Intelligence and False Hope," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Vol. 10, No. 1., Spring 1997, pp. 75-90; Louis Rene Beres, "On Living in a Bad Neighborhood: The Informed Argument for Israeli Nuclear Weapons," POLITICAL CROSSROADS, Vol. 5., Nos. 1/2, 1997, pp. 143-157; Louis Rene Beres, "Where The Shadow Really Falls: Why Israel Must Have Nuclear Weapons," THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, Winter/Spring 1997, Vol. IV, Issue 1., pp. 127-138; Louis Rene Beres, "Israel, Iran and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment," UCLA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1996, Vol. 1., No. 1., pp. 65-97; Louis Rene Beres, "Israel, Iran and Preemption:  Choosing the Least Unattractive Option Under International Law," DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIOONAL LAW, Vol. 14, No. 2., Winter 1996, pp. 187-206; and Louis Rene beres, "The Iranian Threat to Israel: Capabilities and Intentions," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Vol. 9., No. 1., Spring 1996, pp. 51-62.

            [ii].          For the crime of aggression under international law, see: RESOLUTION ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION.  Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 14, 1974.  U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX),  29 U.N. GAOR,  Supp (No. 31)  142,  U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M.  710 (1974).

                        [iii]..        See, by this author: Louis Rene Beres, Chair, The Project Daniel Group, ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE: PROJECT DANIEL, ACPR Policy Paper No. 155, ACPR (Israel), May 2004, 64 pp; Louis Rene Beres, SECURITY THREATS AND EFFECTIVE REMEDIES: ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC, TACTICAL AND LEGAL OPTIONS, ACPR Policy Paper No. 102, ACPR (Israel), April 2000, 110 pp; Louis Rene Beres, ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL IMPERATIVES: THE OSLO AGREEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL STRATEGY, ACPR Policy Paper No. 25, ACPR (Israel), April 1998,  74 pp;  Louis Rene Beres, "Assassinating Saddam Hussein: The View From International Law," INDIANA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No. 3., 2003, pp. 847 - 869; Louis Rene Beres, "The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can It Include Assassination," DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 31, No. 2., Winter 2002, pp. 157 - 177; Louis Rene Beres and Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor," TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 9, No. 2., 1995, pp. 437-449; Louis Rene Beres, "Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law," VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 26, No. 1., April 1993, pp. 111 - 148;  Louis Rene Beres, "After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense," HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW., Vol. 13, No. 2., Spring 1991, pp. 259 - 280;  Louis Rene Beres, "Striking `First': Israel's Post Gulf War Options Under International Law," LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL,  Vol. 14, Nov. 1991,  pp. 10 - 24;  Louis Rene Beres, "Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense,"  ARIZONA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW,  Vol. 8 1991, pp. 89 - 99;  Louis Rene Beres, "After the SCUD Attacks: Israel, `Palestine,' and Anticipatory Self-Defense," EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, Vol. 6., No. 1., Spring 1992, pp. 71 - 104; and Louis Rene Beres, "Israel, Force and International Law: Assessing Anticipatory Self-Defense," THE JERUSALEM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  Vol. 13, No. 2.,  1991, pp 1 - 14.  For a very early examination of assassination as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense by Israel, see: Louis Rene Beres, "On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel,"  HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW,  Vol. 20,  No. 2,  Winter 1991,  pp. 321 - 340.

            [iv]..        The Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 and consecrated the emergence of the modern state system.  After the Peace, which signalled the end of the medieval Holy Roman Empire, power and sovereignty were no longer concentrated in the hands of the Hapsburg emperor, but were decentralized among the imperial princes.

            [v]..        From 1948 onward, Arab states have threatened Israel at the most existential levels.  Looking over these threats, which remain largely unchanged, Israel is denounced as "an instrument of evil," constructed "on a foundation of evil,"  "immutably criminal, irremediable, fit only for liquidation/extermination."  See the discussion of "The External Aspect: Aggression, Intrigues, Exploitation," in Yehoshafat Harkabi,  ARAB ATTITUDES TO ISRAEL,  Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House Ltd.,  1972,  pp. 307 - 310.

                        [vi]..        War and genocide need not be mutually exclusive.  Indeed, war might well be the means whereby genocide is made possible.  According to Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 1951, genocide includes any of several acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such...."  See CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE.  Done at New York,  Dec. 9, 1948.  Entered into force,  Jan 12, 1951.  78 U.N.T.S. 277.  It follows that where Israel is recognized as the institutionalized expression of the Jewish People (an expression that includes national, ethnical, racial and religious components), acts of war intended to destroy the Jewish State could conceivably be genocidal.  Although Israel's enemies are apt to argue that the essential axis of conflict is political, their widely-documented language suggests otherwise.

            [vii]..       According to Wolfgang Friedmann: "The judgment as to when to resort to such  preemptive  measures now places an almost unimaginable burden of responsibility upon the leaders of the major Powers.  But while this immensely increases the necessity for a reliable international detection organization and mechanism, in the absence of effective international machinery the right of self-defence must probably now be extended to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently contrary language of Article 51 of the Charter." (See Wolfgang Friedmann, "The Threat of Total Destruction and Self-Defence" in Louis Henkin et al,  INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS  622 (2d ed, 1987),  at 739-40).  Similarly, says McDougal:  "The more important limitations imposed by the general community upon the customary right of self-defense have been, in conformity with the overriding policy it serves of minimizing coercion and violence across state lines, those of necessity and proportionality.  The conditions of necessity required to be shown by the target state have never, however, been restricted to "actual armed attack";  imminence of attack of such high degree as to preclude effective resort by the intended victim to non-violent modalities of response has always been regarded as sufficient justification, and it is now generally recognized that a determination of imminence requires an appraisal of the total impact of an initiating state's coercive activities upon the target state's expectations about the costs of preserving its territorial integrity and political independence.  Even the highly restrictive language of Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline case, specifying a "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation," did not require "actual armed attack," and the understanding is now widespread that a test formulated in the previous century for a controversy between two friendly states is hardly relevant to contemporary controversies, involving high expectations of violence, between nuclear-armed protagonists." (See Myres McDougal, "The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense,"  57 Am. J. Int'l L.  597 (1963),  in Joseph M. Sweeney et al.,  THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS,  1460 - 61 (3d ed,  1988).

            [viii]..      Hugo Grotius, Of the Causes of War, and First of Self-Defense, and Defense of Our Property,  reprinted in  2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  168 - 75 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1925)(1625).

            [ix]..        The customary right of anticipatory self-defense has its modern origins in the Caroline case, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule.  Following this case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally justified militarily defensive action.  In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require an actual attack.  Here, the framework permitted military response to a threat so long as the danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."  (See Beth M. Polebaum, NATIONAL SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EMERGING STANDARD FOR A NUCLEAR AGE,  59 N.Y.U. L. Rev.  187,  190-91 (1984)(noting that the Caroline case transformed the right to self-defense from an excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine).

            [x]..        See Grotius, at 173 - 74.

            [xi]..        Id at 177.

            [xii]..       See Vattel, The Right of Self-Protection and the Effects of the Sovereignty and Independence of Nations,  reprinted in 3 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  130 (Carnegie Endowment Trust, 1916) (1758).

            [xiii]..      See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.  Done at San Francisco,  June 26, 1945.  Entered into force,  Oct. 24, 1945;  for the United States,  Oct. 24, 1945.  59 Stat.  1031,  T.S. No. 993,  3 Bevans 1153,  1976 Y.B.U.N.  1052.

[xiv]..      Let us recall here the argument of Samuel Pufendorf:  "...where it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me, even though he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin forcible self-defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief, provided there be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, he may put off his hostile temper; or if such admonition be likely to injure our cause.  Hence, he is to be regarded as the aggressor, who first conceived the wish to injure, and prepared himself to carry it out.  But the excuse of self-defense will be his, who by quickness shall overpower his slower assailant.  And for defense it is not required that one receive the first blow, or merely avoid and parry those aimed at him."  See Pufendorf, THE TWO BOOKS ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZENS ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW  32 (Frank Gardner Moore, tr., 1927)(1682).

            [xv]..       For pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, see T.M.C. Asser Institut, RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL  1946 - 1989,  at 456 - 578 (Karel C. Wellens, ed., 1990).

            [xvi]..      See Paul Lewis,  U.N. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center Concealed by Iraq,  NEW YORK TIMES,  Oct. 8, 1991, at A1, A7.  Further, according to Hans Blix, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iraq was working on thermonuclear weapons as well as on simpler fission arms.  See Paul Lewis,  U.N. to Impose New Arms Curbs on Iraq,  NEW YORK TIMES,  Oct. 9, 1991, at A6.

            [xvii]..     In this connection, consider that Saddam Hussein's dedicated effort to build nuclear weapons to use against Israel was deliberately silenced within the American federal bureaucracy nearly two years before the onset of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  The warnings, say various government experts and Congressional investigators, were made early in 1989 by officials of the Department of Energy, but were dismissed as alarmist by Energy Department superiors.  These superiors, who allegedly prevented the National Security Council from imposing pertinent export controls to Iraq, knew of Washington's tilt toward Baghdad as a counterbalance to Iran in the Gulf.  Ultimately, billions of dollars in advanced Western weapons technology flowed into Saddam's nuclear weapons program.  See William J. Broad,  "Warning on Iraq and Bomb Bid Silenced in '89,"  THE NEW YORK TIMES,  April 20, 1992, p. 1, A6.  For a comprehensive inventory of strategic American exports directed toward Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons programs between 1985 and 1990 - exports licensed by the U.S. Department of Commerce,  See "Iraq's Bomb, Chip by Chip,"  THE NEW YORK TIMES,  April 24, 1992, p. A15.

            [xviii]..    See SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS,  Special Supplement, 1948, p. 20.

            [xix]..      See SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS,  S/Agenda/58,  April 16, 1948, p. 19.

            [xx]..       See John Bagot Glubb, A SOLDIER WITH THE ARABS (London: Staughton and Hodder, 1957), p. 79.

            [xxi]..      See Isi Leibler, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL (Australia: The Globe Press, 1972), p. 15.

            [xxii]..     See Leibler, op cit,  p. 60.

            [xxiii]..    Id.

            [xxiv]..    Leibler, p. 18.

            [xxv]..     Significantly, after the June 7, 1981 attack on Osiraq, the executive branch of the U.S. Government immediately condemned the raid, noting "the unprecedented character of which cannot but seriously add to the already tense situation in the area."  In accordance with relevant statutes, Secretary of State Alexander Haig sent a letter to  Congress on June 10, 1981, indicating, on behalf of the President of the United States, that Israeli Air Force units taking part in the attack had been equipped with U.S.-supplied F-15 and F-16 aircraft, and that "a substantial violation of the 1952 agreement may have occurred."  Under questioning, on June 17, 1981, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, and on Europe and the Middle East, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, offered the following responses:  Asked by Representative Lee Hamilton if the Administration agreed with the Israeli Government that Osiraq was designed to produce atomic bombs, Stoessel replied:  "No, we would not agree with that position of Israel.  We understand Israel's concerns, but we are not able to make a definitive judgment, ourselves, which would confirm that Israeli position."  Later, asked by Hamilton if the Administration could agree that  "Iraq ultimately sought to produce nuclear weapons at some time in the future,"   Stoessel replied:  "No, we have no definitive confirmation of that."  See, for these revealing questions and answers, ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES,  Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East,  97th Congress,  First Session,  June 17, 1981,  Washington D.C.,  U.S. Govt. Printing Office,  1981,  132 pp.

<<< Back To Index